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BUDGETING. DECENTRALIZATION. AND AGGREGAT1ON*
BY CHARLES BLACKORBY, DANIEL PRIMONT, AND R. ROBERT Russw.
The purpose of this article is to integrate the man) results on the relationships anlotlgJztnctioiuJl aructure.
consurne'r budgeting and decentralization, price aggregation. and demand aiial;'sis The article then exam-
ines implications of these results for the empirical analysis of consumer expendin4re data. New results
concerning "weakly recursive" structures are also presented.
I. INTRODUCTION
Interest in functional structure, conceived independently by Leontief [1947] and
Sono [1961], was rejuvenated by Strotz [1957, 1959] and Gorman [1959] in the
context of consumer budgeting. Consumer budgeting was defined by Strotz
[1957, p. 271] as follows: "A decision is first made as to how income should be
allocated among the budget branches (given all prices). Each budget allotment is
then spent optimally on the commodities in its branch, with no further references
to purchases in other branches." Strotz and Gorman then went on to show that
this type of behavior is rationalized by certain separability conditions regarding
the consumer's utility function. Moreover, these restrictions on the consumer's
preferences imply empirically refutable restrictions on the system of demand
functions. The Strotz-Gorman analysis of the restrictions on demand functions
implied by (symmetrically) structured direct utility functions was extended by
Goldman and Uzawa [1964]. The demand implications of (symmetrically) struc-
tured indirect utility functions, first examined by Houthakker [1965] and Samuel-
son [1965], were extended by Lau (1969b].
Although separability is an inherently asymmetric concept, all of the above
literature (except for Leontief) focuses on symmetrically structured direct and
indirect utility functions. The demand implications of asymmetrically structured
utility functions were developed by Lady and Nissen [1968] and Primont [1970].
Analysis of asymmetrically structured indirect utility functions can he found in
Blackorby, Nissen, Primont, and Russell [1974].
It was first pointed out by Lau [1969a] that the Strotz-Gorman discussion of
consumer budgeting, extended by Green [1964] and Blackorby, Lady, Nissen, and
Russell [1970], confused two quite different notions corresponding to the two
sentences in the above quote from Strot. A similar observation can be found in
Pollak [1970]. Indeed, a third notion--that of price aggregationpermeates the
discussion of consumer budgeting.
It is the purpose of this paper to integrate the many results on the relationships
between functional structure, consumer budgeting and decentralization, price
* Much of the work on this paper was carried out at the University of Kansas, the geographical
barycenter of the 2-simplex with profile {Boston, La Jolla, Carbmdale}. We are extremely grateful to
the Kansas Department of Economics for making our time spent in Lawrence so pleasant, productive,
and intellectually stimulating, Finally, we have benefitted from the perceptive remarks of Louis Philips
at the NBER Conference in Palo Alto.
23aggregation, and demand analysis and to discuss the implications of these results
for the empirical analysis of consumer expenditure data. As such, most of the
results in this paper can he found in the literature cited above, although thereare
some new results(particularlyconcerning "weakly recursive" structures).'
Although this paper attempts to integrate the literatureon consumer budgeting
and demand analysis in a way which will hopefullyprove useful to demand analysts,
an important caveat should be emphasized: this is not a historically complete
survey of this area of consumer theory. Consequently, the omission of referencesto
important works in the area merely reflectsour own admittedly parochial educa-
tion in this subject. This parochial perspective is also reflected in thefocus and
emphasis of the paper.2
The paper is organized as follows. Section 11 summarizes therelationships
between various separability conditions and functionalstructure. There are few
new results in this section, Section Ill discusses the relationship betweenfunctional
structure and symmetric budgeting, decentralization, and priceaggregation and
Section IV examines the asymmetriccounterparts of these concepts. Section V
contains a few concluding remarks.
11. SEPARABILITY, FUNCTIONAL STRUCTURE,ANI) DEMAND
1. Functional Separability
Letand +be the nonnegative and strictlypositive n-orthants, respectively.
Denote commodity bundlcs by X=[x1 .....xj e, and corresponding price
vectors by P=[p1.....p] e if. Letting the strictlypositive scalar y represent
consumer expenditure, P/y is the normalized price vector.
The variable indices of X andP form the set, y[I.....n].Partition y into
msubsets or sectors, {y'.....;,m},Correspondingly, the vectors X andP have decompositions, X[X'.....XtmJ, and P= [P'. .. .,P"j. Similarly,and have Cartesian decompositions x ... x" and=Q,. x... x When the k-th good (orprice) is in the r-thsector, Xk is a component of X'e andPtiS a component of P'E c.
Let U:-Rbe a strictly quasi..concave,Continuous, non-decreasing utility function, strictly increasingin one coordinate; andlet V: R, defined by
V(P/)=max' 'X
x ,
be the correspondingindirect utility function.Given the propertiesof U, V is necessarily quasi-convex,Contifluou5, nonincreasingand strictly decreasing inone coordinate. For ourpurposes, it is convenient toassume, in addition, that V is (rictly quasi-convex,3
Inthe interesof brevity, all proofsare omitted. Proofs of most of thepropositions are contained in AppendixA tothispaper.Theappendix can beobtained from theauthors. 2For a hitoricaI account of theseparability literature,seeGeary and Morishima[1973]. In many, if not most, of theresults of this paper, theseconditions can be weakenedconsiderably. This could be done, however,only at the cost of seriouslycomplicating the exposition.See Diewert [1974].
U(X)j
24Partitionintoyrand
Cby letting y' jSand define the corres-
pondence, .(Qr)by
fI'(X'. X) = EU('.X')(!(V' X' )
Thiscorrespondence therefore defines a set of points in Y kr each fixed reference
vector (X', X) suchthateachpoint in/(Xr,X')xX'}is "noworse than"
(X', K').
The set of variables, Xr, is said to beseparablefrom the k-th variable in U if
'(X', XC) is invariant with respect to the value of the k-th variable,Xk.This
separability condition is equivalent to Gormans [1968, p. 367] condition that "the
conditional ordering on [1k'] is the same for all" values ofXk.
If U is continuously twice differentiable, the r-th sector,yr,is separable from
the k-th variable if and only if
?(1U!X.\
aU//
for all I,je " and for some kf.That is, marginal rates of substitution between
goods in the r-th sector do not depend on the value of Xk.
Similarly, the set ( is separable from the k-th variable in V. kyr, if the corres-
pondence,ar : P(Qr4),defined by
prpc çpr rp prp
--Q'+ V -,-
yY 1.Y .VY V
is independent of the value of the k-th normalized price Pk/If V is continuously
twice differentiable, this separability condition is
aaV/a(/)-
a(PI'VaV/a(p1/y) -
for all i,j e( and for some k'. Using Roy's Theorem,
-- öIap1
aP/av
whereis defined by P(P, y)V(P/y), the separability condition can be rewritten
as 0, for all i,j E x'.That is, ratios of demand for goods inare
independent of the value of the k-th price.
2. Symmetric Structures
Consumer preferences are said to bedirectly strongly separable4if every
proper subset of the set of sectors,.....xm1is separable from its complement
in U; i.e., the union of any number of sectors is separable from the variables in the
remaining sectors. Strong separability implies, but is not implied by, a weaker
structure, namely weak separability. Preferences aredirectly weakly separable
if every sector,,is separable in U from the variables in all the other sectors.
1*. stro*gly scparablc "in the inrected partition of.' This phraseisimplicitlyincluded
inallof our dicusion of sysnmcthc seperabihiy.
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xi=Results of Debreu [1959] (also proved by Gorman 11968] and Katzner
[1969]), characterize the forms of the utility functions implied by these symmetric
structures. Ifin> 2,preferences are directly separable if andonlyif there exist
continuous functions,,tt
.,f", such that the utility lunction can be written
as
U(X1,..., X") = F(f'(Xt) +... -t-f'"(Xm)),
where F( ) is strictly increasing in its single argument. Of course, U cart he normal-
ized so that
U(X) = f'(X') + ... + fm(X").
If each of the category satisfaction functions of a strongly separablestructure
is homothetic, the function is said to be hoinothetically strongly separable. If.in
addition, each category felicity function is homogeneous of the same degree,
the overall utility function is also homothetic and hence a member of theso called
"Bergson" family of functions.6
Preferences are weakly separable if and only if there exist continuousfunc-
tions, P,f'.....f, such that the utility function can he writtenas
U(X1.....K")P(f'(X').....fm(Xm))
where F(- ) is strictly increasing in each of its m arguments. Ifa function is weakly
separable and each of the category functions is homothetic the functionis said to be
homothetica!ly weakly separable. The function itself neednot be hornothetjc.
Furthermore, in contrast to the homothetically stronglyseparable case, if the
function is homothctically weakly separable butnot strongly separable, each
category felicity function may be trivially normalizedto be positively linearly
homogeneous (PLH).
The above representationscan be adapted to account for unstructuredsectors,
called free sectors by Gorman [1968]. Forexample, each sector{x'.....may be
separable from all other variables, in whichcase there exist functions,P, f'j"'. such that
U(x'.....XM)= F(X',.,.,xIfr(Xr)fm(X"')).
This may not exhaust thestructure, for each category functionmay itself be weakly or strongly separable insome partition of its variables.
Indirect weak and strongseparability is defined analogouslyto direct weak and strong separability byreplacistg the direct utility functionU with the indirect utility function V andX with P/y. Thus, ifm > 2, indirect strong separability is
equivalent to the existence ofcontinuous, strictly quasi-convex,nonincreasing functions v.....Vm,and an increasing continuousfunction t such that
V(P/y) = c(vr(P7,))
If in2, weak and strong
separability coincide and thefollowing additive representation does not go through.
Bergson [1936) was in factonly concernwith a coordinate wise partitionof, but the extension to other partitions issufficiently similar towarrant the same name, If each of thecategory functions is homogeneobut not necessarily ofthe same degree,r log f'(x') is also in the Bergson family.
26Indirect weak separability is equivalent to the existence of continuous, strictly




The discussion of direct weak and strong separability applies equally to the
corresponding indirect structures. (Of course, the monotonicity properties are
inverted so that hornotheticity and PLH in the direct corresponds to negative
hornotheticity and negative linear homogeneity (NLH)7 in the indirect).
In general, direct and indirect separability do not imply one another. How-
ever, U is homothetically strongly (weakly) separable if and only if V is negatively
homothetically strongly (weakly) separable (Lau [1969b] and Blackorhy, Primont,
and Russell [1975]).
3. Asymmetric Structures
It is convenient to introduce some additional notation. The continuation




Similarly, ,-,, r =1.....m. The corresponding vector is
Xl)E=rS
The vectors ,.P and P are defined analogously.
The direct or indirect utility function is strongly recursive in the ordered
partition {f,..3xm}if and only if each continuation rX=t.J,x,r= 2,...,rn,
is separable from the variables in the prior sectors, x'... ,y'' (i.e., variables in
). The direct or indirect utilityfunctiont is weakly recursive in the ordered
partition{x'....."}if and only if each sector, y', is separable from the variables
in the sectors, ,'(i.e., variables in,X_1).
Note that the ordering of the sector indices, I.....m, is important in the
definitions of asymmetric structures. For if a function were, say, strongly recursive
for any permutation of themindices, it is strongly separable. This statement is
also true if "strongly" is replaced with "weakly."
The following results are due to Lady and Nissen [1968], Gorman [1968],
and Pnmont [1970]. First, the utility function is strongly recursive if and only if
there exist Continuous, strictly quasiconcave, nondecreasing functions, f'(.),
f( l, such that
U(X'.....X") = f'(X',f2),
'A functiouf(.)is NLHI() 'f(x)=f(Ax),Ior all .>O.
'Itisthepeekrences whichhavestructure, andarerepresentedby lunctionswhichmirror that







and forr= 1 'n ) is strictly increasing in f
The utility function is weakly recursive if and only if there existCOflhlnuoUs
strictly quasi-concave functions,f( )J( i such that theutility functio1




fifr(yrfrI f'(X'.,ii).' = 2 ni
and
where]'(. ) is strictly increasing in.12 ftmand for r = in. ) is non-
decreasing inxr.
The analogous representation for indirect strong recursivityis




The indirect weakly recursiverepresentation is
(I) V(P/r)r'(P'/, 1,2 rtm),
= r'(P17', 2r),





Blackorby, Nissen, Prirnontand Russell [1974] haveshown that, if L' is homothetic eachfr,rI.....m,is homothetic andcan be chosen PLI-! in the direct stronglyrecursive structure. A similarproof can be constructed for the direct weaklyrecursive structure and, ofCourSe for the indirect structures.
Although nonhomotheticdirect and indirectstrongly recursive functions are independent structures.Blackorby, Nissen,Primont, and Russell [1974] have shown that U isstrongly recursive witha homothetic aggregatorj2 ifand only if V is strongly recursivewith a homotheticaggregator v2. In fact, hornotheticity off 2f-
or v2 implies homotheticity of fr or tr. r = 3. rn. Moreover, thercan he
chosen PLH and the jr can be chosen NLH. Unfortunately, homotheticity does
not generate a dual equivalence relation between direct and indirect weak recnr-
ivity. However, indirect weak recursivity with negatively homothetic aggregator
functions implies (but is not implied by) direct weak recursivity. To see this, recall
that negative homotheticity of the aggregator function implies that there exists
a representation in NLH aggregators. Let us therefore consider each V. r = 2,
, m,in (I) to be NLH. Hence,vm(Pm/y) rm(P) and, recursively,
v1(P'/y, 2v) = v'(P'/v, y y
where




'(vpt2 ,...,r'71)r(P/v, r - FIn)
we have a structure in which the r'. r = I rn. contain nonnorrnalized prices
as arguments.9
Recalling the nature of the separability condition in the indirect, this is
equivalent to the fact that ratios of demand in the r-th sector, r > I, depend only
on prices inrX
=4P), Yi,j e y',r = 2. in.
These systems, together with the sector budget identities.
can be solved for
r- x' yr r2.....
4'(P V).
r=2.....in I.
Of course, the demand functions for goods in f have no structure since V has no
structure in .
Lady and Nissen [1968] and Primont [1970] have shown that the direct
utility function is weakly recursive if and only if there exist conditional demand
functions, 4f, with images.
= (1b'(,P,rY)'
where Y = [y'.....y'] is the vector of optimum expenditures on the commodities
rX
Clearly, (2) implies (3) (but not conversely). As the demand functions for
elements of f have no structure in either case, this proves that indirect weak
recursivity with homothetic aggregators implies direct weak recursivity. These
In faci this structure,impliedby negative homotheucity of v2, is equivalenttoassuming that v is
weaklyrecursive in prices and that prices inarc separable in v from the expenditure variable.
29-
results on conditional demand functions canhe used togenerate flflIflerç
differential restrictions on both the Marshallian and Flicksian demand functj(10
Ill.SYMMETRIC BUDGETING. DECENTRALIZATION. AND A(;GRF(;ATION
1. Introduction
It was pointed out in the introductory section of this paper that there are
actually two distinct concepts embodied in Strotz's [1957, 1959] description of the
process of consumer budgeting. It is forthis reason that this phenomenon has
commonly been referred to as "two-stage optimization." That is, in the first stage
the consumer allocates his income to budget categories and in the second stage the
category incomes are allocated among the components of each category. Lau
[l969a] has pointed out that the set of necessary and sufficient conditions for this
two-stage optimization procedure to yield the correct demands are not necessarily
conditions for either one of the two elements of this procedure taken separately.
It is therefore instructive to deduce separately the necessary and sufficient condi-
tions for each stage of the consumer budgeting procedure described by Strotz.
A third concept, which is intimately related to but distinguishable from the
two stages of Strotz's budgeting procedure, is the notion of price aggregation.
That is, can the initial income allocation be carried out knowing only price
indicessuch as the price of "food"but not necessarily the individual food
component prices? This is the fundamental issue addressed by Gorman [1959]
in his elegant analysis of the Strotz consumer budgeting problem. Thereare
actually two separate but related price aggregation issues. The first issueregards
the existence of income allocation functions in which the pricearguments are
aggregate price indices for each of the budget categories. The second issue involves
the existence of price aggregates which, when multiplied bythe corresponding
cohiposite commodity, yield the optimal expenditureon the corresponding
budget category. There are therefore fourconcepts embodied in the discussion of
consumer budgeting or two-stage optimization, and each hasa separate set of
necessary and/or sufficient conditions (if known).
In fact, it is instructive to dichotomize each ofthese four concepts. As Pollak
[1970] has pointed out, there isa sense in which normalization of prices (dividing
price vectors by total expenditure) isnot a free good when placed in the context of
structured functions. We have already noted inSection II that indirect structure
in normalized prices generally placesweaker restrictions on preferences than do
structural conditions with respectto nonnormaljzed prices. Consequently, it
turns out that differentnecessary and sufficient conditionsare needed for the
rationalization of the fourconcepts discussed above" dependingupon whether
the income allocationor the allocation of category income iscarried out in terms
of normalized prices andnormalized category incomeor in their nonnormalized
counterparts.
!O Theserestrictions and the appropriateset of references can be found in Appendix B. which can be obtajne,j from the authors.
'Actually, ii turnsout that there are only three nontrivialdichotomizat ions since intercategoly income allocation requiresno structure.
30The purpose of this section is to sort out all of these difterent concepts and to
examine the necessary and sufficient conditions in terms of the structure of the
consumer's preferences (i.e., the structure of the indirect and/or direct utility
functions). Many, but not all, of the results in this section can he found in a diverse
set of publications. As the literature in this area has not been entirely consistent
with respect to definitions, the definitions that we adopt cannot be consistent
with all of the papers. Our definitions are, however, internally consistent and as
much as possible consistent with the salient literature.
The discussion is divided into two parts. The first examines the above concepts
in the context of symmetric structures. The second half of the discussion concen-
trates on asymmetric structures, where additional issues are raised (particularly
in the case of weakly recursive structures).
2. Definitions
Budgetahilitt'
Following Lau [1969], we say that a preference ordering is budgetahie if
there exist functions, O, r = I, n. with images,
= O'(P, v),
where, it will be recalled, r' is the optimal expenditure on the r-th group. Note that
since 0r is homogeneous of degree one in P and v, we can write
= Or(P/v, 1) = '(P/v),r = I m.
y
Thus, the preference ordering is budgetable if it is possible to find functions which
permit the consumer to allocate income or income shares among the m budget
categories in a nontrivial way, which is to say without first solving the entire
(single-stage) optimization problem and then defining the appropriate function
as the inner product of the category price vector and the overall demand function.'2
Price aggregation
In the spirit of Gorman's paper [1959], we define strong price aggregation
as the existence of PLH functions, fl'.....if', such that the income allocation
functions, 0'. can be written as follows:
= O"(fl1(P').....fl'(P1"), y),r = 1 ,.., rn.
Similarly, we define weak price aggregation as the existence of functions, fi
such that the income share function can be written as follows:
'(fl'(P'/y).....fl"'(P"/y)),r = 1,. .., m.
Thus, strong price aggregation is defined as the existence of a rule whereby income
may be allocated among the m budget categories knowing only total expenditure
12 In (act, as we shall see below, the existence of the above functions is as vacuous (in terms of
empirical implications) as is the above inner product construction.
31and thc values of the categoryprice indices. Weak price aggregation is equivalent
to the existence of a rulefor determining budget shares knowing only in price
aggregates in normalized prices.It is clear that the homogeneity of degree one of i
in P and y allows us to convertthe strong aggregation function into the weak
aggregation function. Thus, strong priceaggregation implies weak price aggrega-
tion. The converse, however, is not true.
If, in addition to the existence of the aboveprice indices, there exist quantity
indices,f'.....fsuch that
fr(r)= )r'r = I, in,
holds, we say that the preferences are characterized by strong, additire price
aggregation. If this condition is satisfied, it is possible to formulate a first-stage
optimization problem in which the consumer maximizes utility with respect to the
composite cornmodities.f'.....ftm, subject to the budget constraint,
y' flr(pr/,,)fr(r) = r = I in.
If there exist price aggregates in normalized prices.fl1.....rl?t.such that
flr(pr/.). .frXl = YrIY'r = 1 'fl.
we say that the consumer's preferences are characterized by weak, addit ire price
aggregation. If the consumer's preferences satisfy this condition, the sum of the
above equation serves as a constraint in an optimization problem over the f.
Clearly, the PLH of the U' means that strong additive price aggregation implies
weak additive price aggregation, but, again, the converse is not true.
c. Decentralizabitity
If total expenditure is correctly allocated among them budget categories,
it does not follow that the consumer is able to allocate the categoryexpenditures
among the category components optimally without solving the entire optimiza-
tion problem. It is clear that in general the allocation ofexpenditure among, say,
clothing items is not independent of theway in which housing expenditures are
allocated, lilt is possible for the consumer to allocate optimallycategory expendi-
tures knowing only intra-category prices, wesay that the consumer's preferences
are characterized by strong decentralizabilitv, This concept is characterizedas the
existence of m vector valued functions çb'such that
='(P', yf),r = I.....in.
Finally, if there existm vector valued functions denoted' such that
x' ='(p'/)' y'/',)
we say that the consumer's preferencesare characterized by weak decentraliza-
bility. Thus, under strongdecentralizability in order to allocatecategory expendi-
ture correctly, the consumermust know absolute prices of category components
and category expenditurewhereas in the case of weak decentralizability the con-
sumer only has to knownormalized category prices and the budget share of each
32category. Thus, it is clear that strong decentralizability implies weak decentraliza-
bility but that the converse is not true.
d.The Gormanpolar form
An important element in the proofs ofGorman[1959]is the class of preferences
represented by an indirect utility function which can be written as
V(P.)='(rI'p)) +A(P)
where 'P is strictly increasing, Ti is PLH, and A is homogeneous of degree zero.
Throughout this paper. we refer to this indirect utility function as the "Gorman
polar form." This indirect representation generates (see Gorman [1953]), as a
special case where 'P is the identity function, the class of orderings characterized
by linear income consumption curves (which do not necessarily converge to a
common pointmuch less the origin). If, in addition, A(P)0, the Gorman
polar form reduces to a representation of homothetic preferences. If A(P) is linear,
preferences are afilnely homothetic.'3
For each of the category satisfaction functions of a strongly or weakly separ-
able utility function, define
W(Pr, Yr)= max{fr(Xr)Ipr xr r = I.....,n.
For our purpose, endowing each aggregator function, hT, with the Gorman polar
form property turns out to be most useful. Thus, when we refer to a directly
strongly or weakly separable structure with the Gorman polar form, we mean that
the aggregator functions have this form:
hT(P'. Yr)ir(Yr)+ Ar(P),r = I.....rn.
3. Necessary and/or Sufficient Conditions
Bud getability
Lau [1969a] has shown that, even if the direct utility function has no structure
but merely satisfies the maintained regularity properties (see page 46 above), the
function is budgetable:
Proposition 1 (Lau [1969a]): If U(.) is continuous, strictly quasi-concave.
nondecreasing, and strictly increasing in one coordinate, U(.) is budgetable.'4
Strong and weak price aggregation
Strong and weak price aggregation are called strong and weak budgeting by
Pollak [1970], who also provides an example of a preference ordering which is
The linear expenditure sy1em (Stone [1954), Cieary [1949), Klein and Rubin [1948), and Samuel-
son[1948]) and the S-branch system(Brownand Heien [i972]) are generated by affinely homothetic
prefecences.
"Recall that proofs of the propositions stated throughout this paper can be found in Appendix A,
which can be obtained from the authors.
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amenable to strong price aggregationbut has no separability properties. Hence.
necessary conditions for either strong orweak price aggregation would not involve
any separabilityconditions. Gorman [1959] proved, however, that if the direct
utility function were weakly separable,direct homothetic separability or direct
strong separability, where each categoryutility function has the Gormanpolar
form, would be necessary as well as sufficient. We state these relationships in the
next three propositions.
Proposition 2 (Gorman [1959]): Direct homothetic separability implies strong
price aggregation.
Proposition 3 (Gorman [1959]): Direct strong separability with the Gorman
polar form implies strong price aggregation.
Proposition 4 (Gorman [1959]): If U(.) is weakly separable, strong price
aggregation implies either direct homothetic separability or direct strong separ-
ability with category functions restricted by the Gorman polar form.
Weak price aggregation means that the share of the budget which is allocated
to sector r can be written
r= I.....pa.
Each tI' is a price aggregate, useful in intersector allocation decisions, hut doesnot
have many of the nice properties which are desirable for price indices. Inparticular,
it is not solely a function of prices, and it is no' PLH in itsarguments.
Proposition 5 (PolIak [1970)): If V IS Continuously differentiable,indirect
strong separability implies weak price aggregation.
Strong and weak additive aggregation
Definitionally, in the case of additive aggregation,not only do there exist
intercategory allocation functions with priceaggregators as arguments, but in
addition the price aggregates, when multiplied by quantityaggregators, add up to
total expenditure.
Although necessary conditions for additive priceaggregation are not known,
it is well known that homothetic separabilityimplies strong price aggregation.
We have, however, been unable to discovera weaker set of sufficient conditions for
weak additive price aggregation. Consequently,the distinction between weak and
strong additive price aggregationmay be vacuous.
Proposition 6 (Gorman [1959] andBlackorby, Lady, Nissen, and Russell
[1970]): Homothetic weakseparability implies strong additive priceaggregation.
Although homothetic separabilityis not generally necessary forstrong
additive price aggregation, thefollowing necessity theoremcan be proved:
Proposition 7 (Blackorby, Lady,Nissen and Russell [1970]): If U is weakly
separable, strong additive priceaggregation implies homothetic weak separability.
Strong andweak decentralirability
Decentralizability refers to theability of the consumerto make intracategory
income allocations optimallyand efficientlythat is.without requiring informa- tion on all pnces andIncome. The information requiredin order to he able to
34
I
Iallocate category income among the commodities in that category is, of course,
exactly the information which is contained in the conditional demand functions.
Strong decentralizability is a case where only own prices and own category
income is needed. In this case the conditional demand functions are
4(P y,),r = I.....m.
Proposition 9 (Gorman [1971]): Weak separability of U(S) is both necessary
and sufficient for strong decentral izability.
Weak decentralizability requires that knowledge of own normalized prices
and the category budget share are sufficient information for intracategory alloca-
tions to be correct. That is, the intracategory allocation functions can be writtenas
= ),
r1.....in. y y
Proposition 10 (Lau [1969a]): Indirect weak separability implies weak
decentralizability.
Table 1 summarizes the results of this section on symmetric structures. Note
that there are a large number of question marks in the "necessary conditions"
column. For most empirical work, where the appropriate separability conditions
are maintained hypotheses, this paucity of necessary conditions is not very im-
portant. Nevertheless, guided by the principle of Occarn's razor, it would be useful




1. Direct and Indirect Strongly Recursive Structures
Because strongly recursive structures are coordinate-wise weakly separable
in all partitions to the left, there is a great deal of similarity to the symmetriccase.
It is primarily the existence of a free sector inside each category function which
changes the results. In the asymmetric case there are no additive structures, which
means that the Gorman polar form is of little importance. In particular, we call
attention to the fact that the distinction between price aggregation and additive
price aggregation virtually disappears.
a. Recursive price aggregation
Recursive structures do not, ofcourse, generate (symmetric) price aggregation
as defined in Part Ill. However, direct homothetically recursive utility functions
give rise to recursive price aggregation; that is, expenditure on the r-th continua-
tion, z,. =,X, can be written as
r = 2,...,m,

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Moreover, ther are PLH in their arguments. Thus,112is itself a homothetically
strongly recursive structure. Finally, direct homothetic strong recursivity, also
implies strongly recursive additive aggrcgationic.,
flrf'r = 2...., m.
These results are summarized as
Proposition 11:Directhomotheticallystrong recursivity implies recursive
strong price aggregation and recursive strong additive price aggregation.
b. Recursive decentralizabilitv
Analogously to the symmetric case, recursive strong decentralizability is
defined as the existence of vector valued functions,
x'/f(P Zr),r = 2.....
Recursive weak decentralizability is defined by
r=2, m.
y y
Analogy to the symmetric case is completed by the following two propositions:
Proposition 12:Direct strong recursivity is necessary and sufficient for
recursive strong decentralizability.
Proposition 13:Indirect strong recursivity implies recursive weak de-
cent ralizability.
2.Direct Weak Recursivity
In the case of weakly and strongly separable or strongly recursive direct
utility functions, the specific aggregator functions have two rather natural
(mutually consistent) interpretations. On the one hand, they can be thought of as
category utility functions; on the other hand, they may be interpreted as amounts
of surrogate commodities, each of which is the appropriate argument in the utility
function. If, however, the only structure which is imposed upon the direct utility
function is weak recursivity, the first of these two interpretations is inappropriate.
It does not make sense to interpret the specific aggregator functions as category
utility functions because the variables inr+iX are contained in other (higher
numbered) aggregator functions as well as f'.Hence, f'cannot be interpreted is
"the" (specific) utility function forrX' The interpretation of the weakly recursive
aggregators as surrogate commodities, however, becomes somewhat more in-
teresting; in fact, it is suggestive of Lancaster's [19661 idea that satisfaction is
derived from the characteristics of commodities, and hence only indirectly from
the commodities themselves.
The following example might illuminate these interpretations. Let U(.) be
weakly recursive. Then







Suppose we think off(
.)as being the surrogate commodity "warmth." Let.v'
be the vector of different types of clothing, which clearly provide wanri(h Let
fS(.) be the surrogate commodity "shelter," where XS is the Vector of housing
services. Ifs>r, then f may be an argument offl. ) and "shelter" helps provide
"warmth." Let f'() andJU(.) be "recreation" and "food" respectively.Dining
out might be considered to add to the amount of "recreation ;" hence, f is an
argument of f( ). Furthermore vacations are "recreation" and the amount of
vacation time which is taken may affect the amount of "shelter." If so,/'would be
an argument of f(). As a result "food" affects the amount of "warmth" hi'
affecting "recreation" which in turn affectsshelter" which is anargument of
f7(. ). However, it may well be true that "food" affects the amount ol "warmth"
directly, and may itself be an argument of/'( .).If nothing else contributedto
"warmth," we could writefr(. )as
fr(.;fr(,yr fs('f(Xt, .fiX,+.t'). i/),f),/(Xti,
where, for notational convenience, we have assumed that s=r+I,z=r + 2.
and ii=r+ 3.The reader should refer to Chart I for an illustration of the above
example of a weakly recursive structure.
The chart is arranged vertically by levels and horizontally by sectors.At the
r-th level, if one reads across the chart, there appear all of thearguments of the
function f'( ). In our example, clothes (Xe), shelter (f). food (fU)and (possibly)
fu+......fare the aiguments offr(. ) (warmth). At the t-th level, vacations (Xn).
food (f I and (possibly)fU+Iftm are the arguments of f'(' ) (recreation).
At the u-th sector, yU, by reading down the chart,one can find the set of func-
tions (with indices less than u) of which f" (food) isan argument. For example, food
(Ju) isan argument offU( .) (warmth), since it is directly connected tofr(. ) (warmth)
by a solid line. Food (f') is also an argument off'(. ) (recreation) and (possibly)
an argument of f(.) (shelter) for the samereason. On the other hand, f(.)
(recreation), while art argument offS(.)(shelter), is not an argument offr()
(warmth), since it is not directly connectedto f'(.) (warmth) hut only indirectly
through f5(- ) (shelter).
Finally, and perhaps most importantly,the chart is arranged so (hat each
sector is separable from all sectors to its leftbut is not (necessarily) separable from
sectors to its right. Thus, for example,y' is separable fromand y' (but not
necessarily their union) and from'.qI.....r --I.Itis this asymmetric
separability that accounts for theasymmetric appearance of the chart.
Hopefully, the precedingexample illustrates the richness of the weakly
recursive structure. This very richness,however, presents difficulties foraggrega- tion and decentralizationSurprisingly, even if the functionis homothetically




























































































































































































































.weakly recursive, it is notpossible to compute a price of "warmth" thatcould be
used for the purposeof allocation, because the sector itself IS a free Sector
with
respect to thatparticular aggregation problem. Heuristically, the nonexistence of
price aggregates isattributable to the fact that, loin the point of view of the
rth
sector, all higherorder commodities are public goods with respect to the produc
tion of the surrogatecommodityf.It is "public" because the surrogatef not
only provides satisfactiondirectly, but is also used in the production of lowerorder
surrogate commoditieswithout being diminished.
Although weakly recursive directlyutility functions do not possess
sufficient
structure for aggregation tobe possible, a restricted class of decentralization
is
consistent with this structure.lithe optimal amounts °(r') are known, theOptimal
quantities of X can be found. Thatis. the partial demand Iunctjots are
X = V(,P.?Y),r = I,
Knowledge of higher order prices and income allocations is sufficient to make
optimal intracategory decisions. This class of decentralizability is clearly quite
weak, since intracategory allocation decisions require external information
(viz.,r+1P andr+In the following section, a weakly recursive indirectstructure
is shown to imply a somewhat stronger class of decentralizability.
3. Indirect Homothetic Weak Recursiriiv
lithe indirect utility function is weakly recursive with homotheticaggregator
functions, we can choose a representation (see Section II)
V(P/y) ='(P'. 2v)
where
= vr(Pr,,+1t), r2.....rn - I. Urn 1.m(prn)
arid each r',r = 2.....in, is NLH inri.e., )_ Ir = 1v)r = 2.....
in - 1, for all). > 0 and ). - Irm = v"(2Pm). Inverting' in v yields the cost function
C with the representation,
C(LJ, P) =(U, P1. 2t').
As C is PLH in P and each r' is NLH in ,P,





we can represent the cost function by
C(U. P) .= rP(U, P, 2EI),
where
11' = U'(P',,.fI1),r2.....in - I,and11" = fl"(r).
111 is PLH in P1and2FI and each fl', r = 2.....in, is PLH in its arguments.
40As PLH functions of prices only, each UI' has appropriate properties of a price
index. Although they cannot be used in the inter-category allocations properly,
they do have interesting accountability properties. Interpreting IV. r > 1, as the
unit price of the r-th surrogate commodity implies that
rI1''' ann'err'
U=s2 1P OH'
is the compensated demand for the r-th surrogate commodity. In a straightforward
but tedious and messy construction, exploiting Euler's theorem andPLH of the
UI', it is possible to show that the optimal expenditure on commodities inthe r-th
sector is
"I1''
Yr =Pi4j(P'r+i[l) = (UI'- _;Fl},r = 1, in.
iEyr 11rn s=r+l I
Hence, the income expenditure on the r-th sector is equal to the compensated
demand for the r-th surrogate commodity, (3H '/öfl'), times the unit price of the
r-th surrogate, UI', minus the optimal amount of higher order surrogates per
unit of surrogate r, (fl'/0IV)0, times the unit price of the higher order surrogates,
fI. In other words, the expenditure on the r-th sector is equal to the expenditure
on the r-th surrogate minus the indirect expenditure on this surrogatethrough
higher order (public) surrogate commodities. This means that the amount of
"publicness" can at least be costed out in a meaningful manner.
In addition to this nice accountability property, rather strongerdecentraliza-
tion results are available. The application oiRoy's Theorem generatesthe following
image of the (vector valued) conditional demand function for the r-th category:
X' = q'(P',,+ 1II,y,),r = 2.....in.
This is much less information than is needed for decision making inthe direct
weakly recursive structure. In order to make intracategory allocations, own
category prices and higher order price indices still need tobe known, but only
own category income, y,, needs to be known.
4. Weakly Recursive Indirect Utility Functions
lithe indirect utility function is weakly recursive in normalized but not non-
normalized prices, the accountability characterized by the preceding structure
disappears. Suppose
r = 1,.. . , m, v"
r=2.....rn,
Only if v( .) were hornothetic would there exist priceindices as in the previous
case. However, by applying Roy's theorem,
X' =', r+ 1v, ,r2.....in.
y y
41Hence, a limited form ofdecentralizaiion is possible. The ifltracategor\ialloc
tions can be made knowing ownnormalized prices, higher orderaggrcgatorç and
only the budget share of that category.This is clearly a weaker form ofdeeentralj,.t
tion thon that characterized by aweakly recursive cost function.
V. CocuoiN; REMARIS
A rigid logical positivistic posture might lead to an interpretation of the forc
going results as no more than a derivation of the empirically refutable Content of
certain structural restrictions on preferences. White we agree that such exercises
are an important part of economic research, we do not agree that this exhausts the
useful content of economics. Empirical refutation of the implications ofeconomic
hypotheses is, in practice, very difficult toexecute.'6It is, perhaps, for thisreason
that much empirical work is buttressed by fairly strong maintained (untested)
hypotheses. The structural restrictions which rationalize price aggregationand
decentralization are especially useful as maintained hypotheses in empiricalwork.
The two stage optimization problem rationalized by decentra'ability isusefut in
reducing the scope of estimation problems to manageable proportions. Ifdecisjon
making is decentralizable. the demand analyst can first estimateconditional
demand functions for each category and then estimate the incomeallocation
functions.'7Moreover, if the specified utility function satisfies theappropriate
structural restriction, theoretically consistent price indicescan be used in the
estimation of the income allocationfunctions.'8Thus the two stage algorithms
while irrelevant to the derivation of empirically refutable implications,can never-
theless be useful to appliedeconometricians)9The fact that these structuralrestric-
tions can be associated with Strotz-type budgeting procedures,commonlyobserved
by casual empiricists, should offer some Bayesian rationalizationfor the imposition
of these structural restrictions in order to make the workof the applied econo-
metrician a little easier.
Unir'ersity of British Columbiaand
Southern Illinois University
University of Al assachusetis, Boston
Unit ersity ofCalifornia. SanDiego
lTherecentwork ofChristensen, Jorgenson, andLau [I973a,I973b]andChristensen and Manser [1972]hasdramatically improved thepotential for testing structural hypotheses.
Ofcourse, the estimates retain their optirnalitypropertiesonly ifvery severe restrictions are placeci upon the overall matrix.
For examplesof suchtwostageestimation see Heien [1973] and Russell,et al.[1974]. The asymmetric structureslegitimatize ni-stage algorithms whichmight prose useful in estm maming the choke functl0n5generatedbydynamic programming.This could beespeciallyuseful in examining intertemporal demandfunctions Blackorby,Nissen,Primont. andRussell[1973] hae shown that IntertemporaldeciQfl.makingisirnertemporaconsistentifand onlyifthe intertcmporal utility function is stronglyrecursivewith aconsistent (intertemporally stationary)representation.
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COMMENT
InLouis PuLips
When R. Russell sent me the paper under discussion, he made the forecastthat
I would be "both impressed and distressed by the physical weight of the docu-
ment". This forecast was wrong on all accounts: I am impressed by its quality, not
its weight. This is indeed a useful and most interesting paper.
It is useful as a handy reference to and a complete exposition of theavailable
literature on functional structure, the more so as it disentangles issuesthat are
rather confused in the availableprintedliterature.I am thinking especially of
Section 111.3 with its nice distinction betweenbudgetcthility. aggregationand
decentralization.Most interesting, of course, are the sections on "asymmetric
structures" developing the properties of weak and strongrecursivity and the
possible implementations in termsofthe characteristicsofcommodities.
ASYMMETRIC STRUCTURES OVER TIME
Recursivity obviously originated in the analysis of decision-makingover time.
It seems appropriate to indicate a few extensionsofthe analysis presented here
to recursivity over time, in particular tointertemporal utility functions,on which
the authors apparently wrote a paper forthcoming inEconornerica (Iwonder to
what extent the impressive lists of authors of that paper, of the present one,and of
the other ones listed in the bibliography under Blackorby, etc.....arestrongly or
weakly recursive?).
The applicability of the theorems on recursivity tointertemporal decisions is
the more obvious as the notation used is the same as in Koopmans(1960). However,
interesting problems arise as a resultofthe fact that time runs only in one direction.
In the partition of the commodity set, the ordering of thesubjects or sectors has
simply to be "appropriate", and the economist has to make surethat it is so. Over
time, the ordering is determined by the passage of time.
The definition of recursivity given in the paper is based onseparability with
respect to prior time periods, and implies recursivity(of the intertemporal utility
function) "forwards". It is of some interest, then, to introducethe concept of for-
wards separability (with respect to future time periods)which leads to a "back-
wards" recursive intertemporal utility function. That this is not an emptydistinc-
tion can be illustrated by a number of considerations.
First, separability forwards is a weaker assumption thanseparability back-
wards, in terms of descriptive realism, precisely because time runsin one direction.
Second, one can think of intertemporal utility functions that areseparable forwards
but nor backwards. Consider the instantaneous dynamicutility function introduced
by Houthakker and Taylor (19, Chapter V)
u = u[x(z); s(t)]
in which the state variables s, summarizing all past purchases, appear asadditional
45g
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parameters shifting marginal utilities tIpWards or downwards. Beingstrongly
separable forwards, it is strongly recursive backwards ... on the assunlptjor'i that
it represents an intertemporal preferenceordering
Third, backwards recursivity leads to backwards decentralizahility, justas
forwards recursivity implies forwards decentralizability (see the proof of Proposi
tion 12). In other words, "dynamic" models of the Houthakker--Taylor type (as
discussed in the paper by Richard Boyce) imply backwards decentralizability in
the sense that only past (and present) prices and total expenditures have to be
taken into account on the assumption that (a) the intertemporal utility function is
strongly separable forwards and (b) given income (i.e. total expenditures) today is
optimal from an intertemporal point of view. In fact, past prices and expenditures
are taken into account through the state variable "s". However, the budget
constraint used is based on observed, not optimal income, which isa strong
assumption. Indeed, one may wonder why the consumer should be unableto
allocate a given income without error among a commodities, while he wouldbe
capable of making a correct intertemporal income allocation (income beinggiven
without error!).
Finally, the preference inheritance mechanism implied in thesedynamic
models seems sufficient to guarantee intertemporal consistency (asdefined by
Strotz), although there is no strong recursi.'ity forwards.
Of course, the assumption (made above) that u(x : s) is a realisticrepresentation
of an intertemporal preference ordering is hard to swallow. I wouldprefer (see
Philips (1974, Chapter X)) a functional such as
je'1tu(x;s)dt.
But then there is no separability left, neither forwardsnor backwards, and the
Houthakker-Taylor approach appears as "myopic" and difficultto rationalize.
SYMMETRIC STRUCTURES
As for the survey on symmetricstructures and their implications, I would
have welcomed somecomments in the concluding section, on theempirical work
done recently in the field. The authorsseem to suggest that separability has been
treated only as a maintained (untested)hypothesis. In fact, some fairamount of
testing of the hypothesis itself isavailable, as exemplified by workby Barten
(1967, 1969), Byron (1970aand b), Deaton (1972) and myself.
In most cases, theseare tests on strong separability. Invariablythey lead to
rejection. Should we infer thatweak separability is all rightas a maintained
hypothesis? I guessso. But I then wonder about the relevanceof the conditions
about aggregation. Forbudgetability and decentralizationweak separability is sufficient. But ifwe want to use price indices, theorycomes up with a homo. theticity conditionon the branch utility functions.Many applied economists feel
most uncomfortable about this,as we all know that no branchesare homothetic. (So I was greatlysurprised to discover in thepaper by Jorgenson and Lau that branch homotheticitymay show up!)
Should we, in theabsence of homotheticityset up our demand systems in such a way that priceaggregation is not needed? Ifwe do so, does not this amount toartificially supposing that the commoditiestinder study cannot be disaggregated
further down? Or could we say that theconditions for price aggregation refer to
the practicability of budgeting andsimultaneously stress that budgeting is an
artifact imagined by economists but notcarried out in practice by "real"
consumers?
Strangely enough, tests on particular specificationsof functional structure
are very ol1en accompanied (seealso the Jorgenson-Lan paper), by tests ondifferent
"general" restrictions (homogeneity, symmetry,etc.) derived from utility maxi-
mizationper se.This is understandable, as both the"particular" restrictions
(derived from some form of separability)and the "general" restrictions (i.e.
Slutsky conditions) lead to hypotheseswhich are nested in a less restricted model
and therefore make likelihood ratio testspossible, technically speaking. However,
I do not understand the economicrationale for tests of general restrictionssuch
as, say, the symmetry of thecross-substitution effects. How could such a test,in
the present state of the art, inform us aboutthe "existence" of a utility function?
When we test weak against strongseparability, we have two conflicting
hypotheses, both imbedded in utilitymaximization. And to carry out the test, we
use some specification ofthe utility functionhopefully one thatis compatible
with observed behavior (on this, see Basmannet al.(1973) and Byron (1973))in
order to have estimating equations to workwith. On the contrary, when we test
symmetry or any other Slutsky condition, we arein fact testing utility maximization
itself, and even touching the basic axiomsof the theory of value. But is not an axiom
something in which one belieees? And if, lessdramatically, one has his doubts about
utilitymaximizationonly, where is the alternative behavioralassumption against
which to test it (in the framework of the same setof axioms about the preference
ordering)? In the present state of the art,all we can do is to test symmetry against
the absence of symmetry. Butwhere is thetheorythat formally incorporates the
absence of symmetry? In fact, one ishoping that the raw (unrestricted) datawill
give the answer, that "the data willspeak". However, there are nounrestricted
data (data never speak by themselves), as wealways need some model specification
to make computationspossible. It is impossible, then, to make surethat the test is
a test of the symmetryassumptions rather than of the underlyingmodel specifica-
tion (e.g. the utility function used toderive or implied in the estimatingequations).
That is why I am not too impressed(and certainly not distressed) when Ihear that
the theory of demand does not even getpassing marks in the examination pro-
cedure set up in the Jorgenson-Lau paper.
Université Catholique de Louvain
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